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Abstract 
This thesis addresses an example of multiple-use commons problems: the case of 
land  use  for  forestry  and  reindeer  husbandry.  Forestry  use  land  for  industrial 
purposes while reindeer husbandry (practiced by the indigenous people, the Sami) 
use the same land for reindeer grazing. The land use rights are shared between the 
two  sectors:  forestry  owns  the  forest  resource  while  reindeer  husbandry  has 
usufructuary rights. Among other things, the parallel land use and property rights 
situation are the reasons why land use is problematic. An institutional arrangement, 
consultations,  was  installed  to  ease  the  conflicts  over  land  use.  However, 
consultations have shortcomings since conflicts over land use still occur.  
The  institutional  and  development  (IAD)  framework  is  used  to  analyze 
consultations.  To  analyze  the  nature  of  the  problem,  the  individuals  and  the 
institutions  involved  is  studied  by  using  the  ladder  of  participation,  design 
principles, social planner’s model, and transaction cost theory. The intent is to, by 
using interdisciplinary theories and methods, discuss the economic aspects of natural 
resource  management  in  general,  and  the  forestry-reindeer  husbandry  land  use 
problems in particular.  
The results show that the current institutional arrangement does not lead to a 
stable outcome. One reason for this instability is the uneven power relation within 
consultations. Additionally, there is unevenness between the sectors in economic 
terms. To overcome the shortcomings of the institutional arrangement, the thesis 
identifies possible improvements to the consultation process, applicable within the 
present legal framework.  
The  thesis  provides  valuable  contributions  to  the  knowledge  of  the  forestry-
reindeer husbandry land use management, and to the theoretical understanding of 
multiple-use commons. 
Keywords:  co-management,  conflict  management,  design  principles,  institutional 
analysis  and  development  (IAD)  framework,  ladder  of  participation,  Rangifer  t. 
tarandus, Sami, social planner’s model, transaction costs. 
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Sammanfattning 
Oenigheter och konflikter om användning och förvaltning av naturresurser, särskilt 
gemensamma  resurser,  är  ett  utbrett  problem  runt  om  i  världen.  Det  finns  flera 
orsaker till detta. Där ibland återfinns att resursanvändaran ofta har olika syften med 
sitt  nyttjande,  komplexa  äganderättsstrukturer,  samt  skillnader  i  kulturella  eller 
ekonomiska bakgrunder. En tänkbar lösning på oenigheter och konflikter kan vara 
att skapa ett institutionellt ramverk för att reglera användandet av resursen.  
Skogsresursen i norra Sverige används parallellt mellan rennäring och skogsbruk. 
Rennäring  bedrivs  av  renskötande  samer,  ursprungsbefolkning  i  Skandinavien, 
medan  skogsbruk  bedrivs  av  storskaliga  skogsföretag
1.  Konflikterna  kring  hur 
marken ska nyttjas blev mer allvarlig sedan skogsbruket industrialiserades. För att 
lösa konflikterna mellan de båda näringarna instiftades samråd 1979, vilket skapade 
ett  tillfälle  för  näringarna  att  mötas  och  diskutera  hur  marken  ska  nyttjas.  Det 
uppstår emellertid fortfarande konflikter över hur marken ska användas. 
Syftet i avhandlingen är att analysera effektiviteten och stabiliteten av samråd. De 
bakomliggande frågeställningarna är: 
  Hur har relationen mellan rennäring och skogsbruk utvecklats? 
o  Hur ser användarna på samrådssituationen? 
o  Vilka är anledningarna till varför inte samråden fungerar? 
  Vilka möjligheter finns det att förändra nuvarande samrådsprocess? 
o  Vilka begränsningar finns inom nuvarande samråd? 
  Hur påverkar förändringar av samrådsprocessen policy för samråden? 
o  Vilka förändringar behövs för fortsatt framtida samexistens? 
Resultaten  visar  att  samråden  inte  kan  karaktäriseras  som  ett  hållbart,  stabilt, 
samförvaltningssystem, eftersom konflikter över markanvändning fortsätter att ske, 
samråden till trots. Anledningen till att samråden inte fungerar tillfredsställande beror 
främst på tre variabler: (1) Lavresursen är knapp vilket gör att konflikterna inom 
samråden  blir  mer  komplexa.  För  att  tillgodose  betesbehovet  är  rennäringen  allt 
oftare  tvingade  att  neka  föreslagna  avverkningar  och  även  om  skogsbruket  kan 
acceptera ett moratorium för en kortare period, måste området avverkas förr eller 
senare. (2) Den historiska utvecklingen av markanvändning i norra Sverige och dess 
skiften mellan jordbruk, skogsbruk, gruvnäring och rennäring har lett till förvirring. 
(3) Detta har förstärkts av att det juridiska ramverket också varierat beroende på vad 
skogsnäringen bör fokusera på, från att främja återväxt av skogen, till att maximera 
produktionen, till att kombinera produktion med miljömål.  
Resultat visar också att makten är ojämnt fördelad inom samråden mellan de båda 
näringarna. Detta baseras främst på hur äganderätten är fördelad mellan näringarna. 
Skogsbolagen, med sin äganderätt, är den starkare parten inom samråden jämfört 
med rennäringens nyttjanderätt. Rennäringen anser sig också ha ett svagt inflytande 
                                                 
1 Skogsbruk bedrivs också av enskilda privata skogsägare, men dessa utelämnas eftersom dessa 
inte omfattas av samrådsplikten.  
i samråden. Ytterligare en orsak till att skogsbolagen är starkare i samråden baseras på 
dess ekonomiska ställning i samhället. Skogsbolagens resultat påverkar såväl bolaget 
och dess ägare som regionen som helhet.  
Vidare, visar resultat att det är mer ekonomiskt fördelaktigt för skogsbruket att 
kompensera  rennäringen  för  förluster  av  betesmark,  jämfört  med  att  anpassa 
skogsbolagets planer till rennäringens betesbehov. Här har dock ingen hänsyn tagits 
till det kulturella värdet av rennäringen för den samiska kulturen. Dessutom anses 
rennäringen  vara  av  nationellt  intresse.  Därför  lyfts  frågan  vad  som  krävs  för  att 
skapa ett hållbart och stabilt samförvaltningssystem av skogsresursen för att försäkra 
att båda näringarna kan fortsätta samexistera. 
Föreliggande  avhandling  fokuserar  främst  på  att,  inom  nuvarande  lagstiftning, 
hitta hållbara samförvaltningslösningar. Förbättringar kan ske både via den officiella 
vägen  (Riksdagen)  och  via  den  frivilliga  vägen  (certifieringen  FSC,  Forest 
Stewardship  Council
2).  Resultaten  visar  att  effekten  av  transaktionskostnader  av 
samråd  är  ojämnt  fördelade  mellan  näringarna.  För  att  kunna  skapa  en  jämnare 
fördelning  av  transaktionskostnader  och  därmed  förbättra  samrådsprocessen  krävs 
förbättringar inom följande områden: 
  klargörande av syfte och innehåll i samråden, 
  jämka planeringsperspektiv (tids- och områdesperspektiv),  
  kunskap om resursen och varandras näringar, och 
  skapa konfliktlösande mekanismer. 
Genom att skapa en tydlig definition av samråden och vad som ska ingå, vet 
parterna vad som kan förväntas. Genom att även justera planeringshorisonten (både i 
tid  och  område)  kan  parterna  diskutera  markanvändning  på  samma  villkor.  I 
nuvarande samrådsprocess sker samråden sent i skogsbolagets planeringsprocess. Om 
samråd med rennäringen skulle ske tidigare i skogsbolagets planeringsprocess kan 
också rennäringens intressen bättre införlivas i skogsbolagets planering, dvs. större 
hänsyn  tas  till  rennäringen  i  samråden.  Ytterligare  vinning  kan  erhållas  om 
rennäringen på ett tidigt skede känner till avverkningsplaner och därmed kan beta 
ett område mer intensivt inför en avverkning och spara andra områden.  
Kunskapen om resursen och om varandras näringar nämndes också som en viktig 
parameter  att  förbättra  i  samråden.  Här  kan  forskning  fylla  en  viktig  funktion. 
Ytterligare en viktig aspekt att förbättra är att skapa mekanismer (till låg kostnad) för 
att lösa de konflikter som inte kan lösas via samråden.  
Om de föreslagna förändringarna implementeras inom samråden skulle effekten 
av transaktionskostnader på vardera näring bli mer jämnt fördelade, i varje fall på 
lång  sikt.  Problemet  är  dock  att  incitamenten  att  införa  förändringar  är  olika. 
Rennäringen har starka incitament att införa de föreslagna förändringarna eftersom 
de  behöver  säkerställa  framtida  betesbehov.  Skogsbrukets  incitament  är  betydligt 
svagare, baserat på de juridiska kraven och marknadens krav via FSC. Även om 
rennäringen har mest att vinna på en förändring är deras äganderätt så svag att de 
inte har någon möjlighet att själva initiera förändringar.  
                                                 
2 Alla skogsbolag som äger mark i renbetesområdet är certifierade via FSC.  
Slutligen, resultaten av dessa studier visar att det finns en vilja hos både ren- och 
skogsnäringen att göra förändringar för att stärka samrådsprocessen. Starka externa 
krafter  som  kan  tänkas  påverka  skogsbolagen  (och/eller  staten)  att  förändra 
samrådsprocessen är certifieringssystemen (FSC eller PEFC). Ytterligare påverkan 
kan  ILO  169  (International  Labor  Organization)  ha  om  Sverige  skulle  ratificera 
konventionen. Under 2002 beslöt FSC internationellt också att ILO-konventionens 
paragrafer  om  ursprungsbefolkningars  markanvändning  skall  inkluderas  i  FSC, 
oavsett  om  landet  ratificerat  föredraget  eller  inte.  Detta  borde  få  stor  effekt  på 
samrådsprocessen  i  Sverige  tillsammans  med  förtydligande  av  ägande-  och 
nyttjanderätten av skogsmark i norra Sverige.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
Disagreements and conflicts
1 related to the use and management of natural 
resources are common problems in most countries around the world. Key 
issues to address in such cases are those associated with ‘collective action’, 
e.g. the need to establish effective rules to control the use of the natural 
resources in order to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’
2 and to mitigate 
externalities
3 (Hardin, 1968; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1997; Ostrom, 
2003; 2005; Kyllönen et al., 2006). A possible solution to such problems in 
some cases is to establish institutional arrangements for regulating use of the 
land  (Berkes,  1989;  Pinkerton,  1989;  Ostrom,  1990;  Baland  &  Platteau 
1996; Ostrom et al., 1997; Ostrom, 2005; Bromley, 2006). The ways in 
which certain institutional arrangements work and, more importantly, how 
they may facilitate sustainable management, depend on a complex web of 
factors,  e.g.  the  physical  needs  of  the  stakeholders,  societal  and  judicial 
factors and the interactions between the actors involved (Dietz et al., 2002; 
Ostrom, 2005). 
                                                 
1 Management of a conflict or a dispute refers to “desirable and feasible changes [that] can be made 
in a problematic situation in order to improve the situation” (Walker & Daniels, 1997, p.2). The 
term ‘conflict management’ is thus used to characterize situations where conflicts may not 
be fully resolved, but the situation is at least improved (Walker & Daniels, 1997). In a 
democratic society, conflicts per se are not necessarily problematic. Rather, the opposite, 
since a lack of conflict may indicate an undemocratic society in which conflicts are not 
allowed  to  surface  (Lukes  1974;  Raitio,  2008).  However,  intense  conflicts  that  remain 
unmanaged and unresolved may lead to insecurity and frustration (Hellström, 2001). 
2 Over-use and degradation of a resource. 
3 Adverse effects of stakeholders on other sets of stakeholders when using a resource.   14 
 
In  analyses  of  natural  resource  management,  common  pool  resources 
(CPR)  are  of  particular  interest.  In  this  context  a  CPR  is  “a  natural  or 
manmade resource that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 1990, 
p.30). In some cases the use of commons may be relatively straightforward, 
for instance in cases where all stakeholders have identical rights to use the 
resources and have the same objective: to acquire benefits from the resource 
(Oakerson, 1992). However, many CPR situations are more complex, for 
instance  multiple  kinds  of  stakeholders  may  use  the  resource  for  widely 
differing objectives, the property rights may be complex and the stakeholder 
groups may be culturally, economically or otherwise heterogenic (Edwards 
& Stein, 1998). In such cases there is an extensive need for negotiations and 
trade-offs among users to maximize welfare.  
The forest resource, including both timber and ground vegetation, in 
Northern Sweden and its multiple uses provide an interesting case in point. 
Several sets of stakeholders with unevenly distributed power and differing 
rights use the land in parallel to each other, with different objectives. These 
objectives include protection of biodiversity, recreational use of forestland, 
and  use  of  forestland  for  industrial  purposes,  e.g.  forestry,  mining  and 
reindeer (Rangifer t. tarandus) husbandry. Of particular interest here are the 
foci  of  the  interdisciplinary  Mountain  Mistra  Research  Program
4  (which 
financed  the  studies  this  thesis  is  based  upon):  the  large-scale  forestry 
industry and the small-scale reindeer husbandry practiced by the indigenous 
people, the Sami
5. Forestry and reindeer husbandry are parallel land uses for 
which institutional arrangements in the form of consultations between the 
practitioners were introduced by the Swedish Forestry Act in 1979 (SwFA, 
1979:429) and extended geographically by the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) in 2000 (FSC, 2000). These consultations were intended to provide 
an arena for the stakeholders to meet and discuss land use issues, in order to 
reduce land use conflicts and externalities. However, conflicts over land use 
management are still occurring despite the consultations. 
 Two main contributors to the conflicts over land use between forestry 
and reindeer husbandry have been identified. First, property rights over the 
forestland  are  divided  between  the  two  groups  of  stakeholders:  forestry 
                                                 
4 The Mountain Mistra Research Program was an interdisciplinary research program focusing 
on 15 municipalities in the northern mountain area in Sweden. The main objective of the 
program was to find strategies for management of the mountain region’s resource, based on 
scientific results (Fjällfokus, 2003). 
5  The  government  recognized  the  Sami  as  the  indigenous  people  of  Sweden  in  1977 
(Johansson, 2008).   15 
interests (mainly forestry companies, non-industrial private owners and the 
State) own the resource while reindeer herders
6 have usufructuary rights, 
originating  from  time  immemorial
7.  This  imbalance  in  property  rights 
provides  insufficient  protection  of  the  reindeer  herders’  grazing  rights 
(Hahn,  2000).  The  property  rights  imbalance  has  also  led  to  an  uneven 
power distribution between the stakeholders in the institutional arrangement 
(Paper  II).  Second,  forestry  imposes  externalities  on  reindeer  husbandry 
since the timber harvests reduce the value of the land for grazing, which is a 
key  parameter  for  the  viability  of  reindeer  husbandry.  A  further 
complication  is  that  natural  grazing  has  not  been  valued  economically 
(Hahn, 2000; Paper II; Paper IV). 
1.2  Previous Research 
There  has  been  extensive  research  on  the  use  of  natural  resources  and 
proposed solutions to associated social dilemmas. In relation to land used for 
both forestry and reindeer husbandry, a number of studies warrant special 
mention. Mattson (1981) provided a thorough outline of the development 
of the relationship between forestry and reindeer husbandry, concluding that 
conflicts over land use have escalated, due partly to the mechanization of 
forestry, partly to fluctuations in reindeer stock and partly to the technical 
development of reindeer husbandry (Mattsson, 1981). About 20 years later, 
in  2000,  Hahn  discussed  management  of  conflicts  between  small  game 
hunting, forestry and reindeer husbandry. Hahn focused on the property 
rights involved, and the findings indicate that the property rights provide 
insufficient protection for grazing rights, resulting in imbalance of power 
between the stakeholders (Hahn, 2000).  
There have also been several studies on economic aspects of forestry and 
reindeer  husbandry.  Notably,  Parks  et  al.  (2002)  developed  an  analytical 
framework to study management and policy-driven environmental changes 
in the Swedish mountainous area, based on simulated timber and reindeer 
                                                 
6 The term reindeer herder is used for Sami who conduct reindeer husbandry. Reindeer 
herding is legally protected as an exclusive Sami livelihood, such that only persons of Sami 
descent can own, and hence make a living, from reindeer herding. However, not all Sami 
own reindeers or are reindeer herders (about 20 000 Sami live in Sweden (Sametinget 
2008), and of them about 4 700 herd reindeer (Statistics Sweden, 1999)).  
7 The Swedish Government acknowledged that the Sami had exclusive right to use land 
before modern property rights emerged. However, the exact contents of these rights are 
unclear  and  the  geographical  boundaries  are  also  questionable.  The  recent  Boundary 
Delimitation Commission of 2006 formally clarified boundaries of grazing areas in northern 
Sweden (Hahn, 2000; SOU 2006:14).     16 
stock harvest decisions. Using this framework, Bostedt et al. (2003) analyzed 
the effects of timber harvest decisions, and their results imply that reindeer 
husbandry’s profits would be increased by a reduction in timber harvests, 
with  relatively  low  opportunity  costs  for  timber.  Zhou  (2006)  further 
considered the effects of land use choices on reindeer herding profits by 
optimizing timber and reindeer harvest decisions under various management 
scenarios. Bostedt (2005) studied the pastoralist behavior of reindeer herders, 
and found that the utility of being a reindeer herder plays an important role 
in the production of reindeer meat. Further, the study highlighted the need 
for  more  research  on  the  economic  circumstances  of  reindeer  herders 
because  the  economic  returns  are  marginal  so  even  minor  externalities 
caused by other land users can profoundly affect them (Bostedt, 2005). This 
result is also supported by Riseth (2006).  
More general studies on land use issues include the thesis presented by 
Allard  (2006)  and  Beland  Lindahl  (2008).  Allard  compares  the  interface 
between environmental law and Sami law, with analogous situations in New 
Zealand and Canada. Although the institutional arrangement is not directly 
considered in the cited thesis, it states that as the competition for use of the 
natural  resource  is  increasing.  Reindeer  herding  would  gain  from 
integration of reindeer husbandry policy with natural conservation policy 
since land use planning for forestry would become more integrated with 
measures to limit exclusion (Allard, 2006). Beland Lindahl (2008) discusses 
the politics of natural resource management, focusing on the forest resource. 
Although she does not deal only with reindeer husbandry and forestry, she 
recognizes the problems for reindeer herders caused by the management of 
forests, and the conflicts between reindeer husbandry, nature conservation 
and  forestry.  She  concludes  that  integration  of  these  issues  with  forest 
management  would  probably  be  helpful  for  reindeer  husbandry  (Beland 
Lindahl, 2008).  
Few studies have specifically addressed the institutional arrangement of 
consultations. However, Sandström et al. (2006) discuss the possibilities for 
the future co-existence of forestry and reindeer husbandry by altering the 
institutional arrangement to avoid the problems associated with collective 
action.  Further,  Keskitalo  (2008)  states  that  the  conflict  over  land  use  is 
manifested at the state level, through the creation of legal frameworks, and 
the  international  level,  through  actions  by  actors  such  as  the  FSC.  It  is 
therefore important to see the land use conflict through the eyes of both 
local  actors  and  national/international  actors  (Keskitalo,  2008).  Sehlin 
MacNeil (2006) assesses the specific possibility of managing conflict through 
the use of a mediator. The cited study shows that dialogue between the   17 
stakeholders promotes conflict management and increases understanding of 
each  other’s  sector.  The  use  of  a  mediator  is  also  preferred  to  solving 
conflicts legally, although mediation has been rarely used in practice (Sehlin 
MacNeil,  2006).  In  addition,  Persson  (2000)  provided  a  reindeer  care-
adapted forestry plan, intended to be a tool in consultations to understand 
reindeer  husbandry  land  use  needs.  The  adapted  forestry  plan  consists  of 
practical  techniques  to  include  information  on  reindeer  husbandry  in 
forestry  plans  and  can  be  used  digitally  by  stakeholders,  including  forest 
companies,  non-industrial  private  forest  owners  and  reindeer  herders 
(Persson, 2000). 
However, research on multiple-use commons and conflict management 
within an institutional arrangement are few, especially with focus on the 
economic implication of a CPR. This thesis intend to attempt to fill this 
gap.  
1.3  Purpose and Intended Contribution 
The research questions of the studies this thesis is based upon (Papers I-IV), 
were three-folded.  
 First,  how  has  consultations  evolved  and  how  is  the  situation 
understood by the two stakeholders? Further, what are the reasons to 
why the institutional arrangement does not work satisfactory?  
 Second, what are the possible alternatives to the present consultation 
process?  What  are  the  limits  of  present  consultations  and  what 
possible changes can be made to the consultation process?  
 Finally, what are the policy implications of possible changes? What 
changes are required to ensure continued co-existence? 
The objective of the thesis is thus to analyze the robustness, thus stability 
and viability, and efficiency of the institutional arrangement established to 
ease the relationship between forestry and reindeer husbandry in a two-step 
manner.  First the exogenous variables affecting the consultations (Paper I) 
were  explored,  and  then  the  outcome  of  the  consultations  was  analyzed 
both empirically (Paper II) and theoretically (Papers III & IV). In the section 
on research design (4), the framework and methods are discussed.  
The  work  provides  both  theoretical  and  empirical  contributions.  The 
theoretical contribution consists of further development of CPR-models for 
analyzing multiple-use CPR resources in terms of economic concepts: social 
planning and transaction costs. The empirical contribution consists of the 
evaluation of the management of land used for both forestry and reindeer 
husbandry  in  Northern  Sweden  to  identify  possible  tools  to  improve   18 
consultations  and  avoid  the  ‘tragedy  of  the  commons’  and/or  other 
problems commonly associated with the use of such resources. 
Some  limitations  should  also  be  mentioned.  The  forest  resource  has 
multiple  users,  including  other  users  apart  from  the  forestry  sector  and 
reindeer herders, who use the resource in parallel. Each stakeholder group 
using  the  resource  affects  the  others  to  varying  degrees,  thus  causing 
externalities. The scope of the studies is restricted to the parallel land use by 
the forestry and reindeer herding sectors, leaving conflicting land uses by 
other stakeholders’ for future research.  
1.4  Analytic Approach 
It was assumed at the start of the Mountain Mistra Research Program that the 
common use of land for forestry and reindeer husbandry, in conjunction 
with  the  shortcomings  of  the  institutional  arrangement,  poses  a  potential 
threat to their continued co-existence. If so, it is important to understand 
the  underlying  aspects  of  this  relationship.  To  avoid  a  tragedy  of  the 
commons  and  the  stakeholder’s  entrapment  in  a  ‘prisoner’s  dilemma’ 
situation
8, as further discussed in section 3, the natural resource needs to be 
regulated.  Either  representatives  of  the  stakeholders  themselves,  or  the 
government  (central  or  local)  could  control  access  to  and  regulate  the 
resource, i.e. manage it (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). The term management 
can be defined in various ways, depending on the situation, but here it is 
understood as “the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource 
by making improvements” (Ostrom & Schalger, 1996, p. 131). Management of 
CPR consists of setting degrees of access to and regulating the resource, in a 
manner that is beneficial to all parties, as far as possible, ideally with at least 
some  degree  of  co-management  (Ostrom,  1990;  Carlsson,  1999;  Hanna, 
1994; 2003; Rova 2004). 
The forestry-reindeer husbandry land use is a multiple-use situation with 
two  groups  of  stakeholders  using  the  resource  for  different  purposes, 
complicating  land  use  management.  In  addition,  lichens  are  negatively 
affected  by  timber  harvests,  thus  the  management  method  may  have 
profound effects on both forestry and reindeer husbandry. Further, every 
management situation is associated with some transaction costs, i.e. the cost 
to  maintain  property  rights,  which  will  increase  with  increases  in  the 
regulation  of  the  management  situation
9  (Ostrom,  1990;  Carlsson,  1999; 
Rova, 2004). However, the current institutional arrangement seems to have 
                                                 
8 Meaning that stakeholders act in a self-interest way that may be detrimental to all. 
9 See further discussion in Paper II.   19 
serious  shortcomings,  insufficiently  regulating  land  use  to  avoid  conflicts. 
Hence,  the  institutional  and  development  (IAD)  framework  is  used  to 
evaluate its robustness and efficiency (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al., 1997; 
Imperial 1999; Ostrom, 2005). This framework was specifically developed 
to analyze complex community systems and the framework does not restrict 
the researcher to the use of any particular theory or model (Ostrom et al., 
1997;  Ostrom,  2005).  Among  the  strengths  of  the  framework  is  that  it 
recognizes  the  contextual,  independent  conditions  of  the  management 
situation, i.e. physical, biological, social, economic and cultural conditions 
that may affect the institutional design (Imperial, 1999). 
Institutional  analysis  addresses  both  the  characteristics  of  the  problems 
individuals in the management situation face, and the rules used to manage 
the  resource.  Thus,  it  requires  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the 
problem,  the  individuals  and  the  institution
10  involved  (Ostrom,  1990; 
Ostrom  et  al.,  1997;  Imperial,  1999;  Ostrom,  2005).  Hardin’s  (1968) 
‘tragedy of the commons’ and the resolution of other problems associated 
with  collective  action  and  common  pool  resources  can  be  mitigated  by 
using appropriate institutions and institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom et al., 1997; Imperial 1999; Ostrom, 2005).   
When  analyzing  an  institutional  arrangement  in  terms  of  the  IAD 
framework, a key aspect to consider is the ‘action arena’, in this case the 
consultations,  in  which  stakeholders  participate  in  the  decision-making 
regarding the resource and share the costs and benefits associated with the 
decision-making arrangements (Ostrom et al., 1997; Imperial 1999; Ostrom, 
2005). The action arena is affected by the independent variables (physical 
and societal attributes, and rules in use) analyzed. The nature of the problem 
affects the actors and the action arena. Further, the action arena is affected 
by  the  patterns  of  interactions,  which  in  turn  affect  the  outcome  of 
interactions in the action arena (Imperial, 1999; Ostrom, 2005). An action 
arena  can  also  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  the  levels  of  rules  that  affect  the 
stakeholders’  actions.  Three  levels  of  rules  can  be  distinguished.  First, 
operational level rules affect day-to-day decisions. Second, collective-choice 
rules affect the operational activities and determine the stakeholders that are 
to be included in the arena. Finally, constitutional-choice rules also affect 
the  operational  activities  and  include  a  set  of  rules  needed  to  craft  the 
collective-choice rules, further affecting the operational rules. The effort and 
cost of changing the rules increase as the level of rules rises (Ostrom et al., 
1997). This thesis focuses on the collective-choice level of rules.  
                                                 
10 The term institution is understood as the “rules of the game in a society […] that shape human 
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The  complexity  of  the  contextual  factors,  focusing  primarily  on  the 
resource, the community and its impact on the common resource, and the 
rules used to regulate its use, has to be addressed. In addition, the size and 
heterogeneity  of  stakeholders  involved  in  the  management  situation  may 
further complicate the situation. The size of a group is relevant in solving 
collective action problems, since the transaction costs seem to increase with 
the size of the stakeholder group. In addition, the communication between 
stakeholders becomes increasingly complex as the number of stakeholders 
rises (Ostrom, 2005). Heterogeneity between stakeholders may also cause 
problems  in  an  institutional  arrangement.  Typical  heterogeneities  are  in 
cultural  background,  interests  and  endowments.  Creating  an  effective 
institutional  arrangement  with  heterogeneous  stakeholders  is  challenging, 
and there is a risk that the more powerful group of actors (politically or 
economically) may dominate the weaker group (Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Ostrom, 2005).  
1.5  Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In section two the study 
area and its actors are described. In section three the theoretical framework 
of  this  thesis  are  presented  and  section  four  discuss  the  research  design. 
Further, section five briefly summarizes the appended papers. In section six 
the main findings and their implications are discussed and the four papers 
from which the results are drawn are presented in the appendix.   21 
2  The Study Area and Actors 
The region this thesis and the underlying studies concerns is the northern 
part of Sweden; more specifically the northern parts of Dalarna, Jämtland, 
Västerbotten  and  Norrbotten  (see  the  grey-shaded  area  in  fig.  1).  This 
region,  which  covers  about     
204 000 km
2 (ca. 45% of the total 
land  area  of  Sweden)  is  sparsely 
populated,  especially  inland, 
although there are urban centers 
close  to  the  coast,  with  an 
average  density  of  ca.  3.2
11 
inhabitant/km
2. Farming, forestry 
and  reindeer  husbandry  are  the 
main traditional private land uses, 
while the main industrial uses are 
mining  and  forestry.  The 
industrial  use  of  land  developed 
following  the  colonization 
process,  beginning  in  the  16
th 
century.  The  colonizers,  who 
used  land  for  both  agricultural 
and  forestry  purposes,  and 
reindeer herders have been living 
side  by  side  for  centuries,  but 
conflicts  over  land  use  have 
escalated  in  the  last  50-60  years 
since the industrialization began
12.  
                                                 
11 Compared to the average density of people of Sweden 20/km
2. 
12 See Paper I for a historical overview of land use in northern Sweden. 
Figure 1. Northern Sweden, reindeer 
herding area and Reindeer Herding 
Communities (RHC).   22 
2.1  The Forest Resource, Forestry and Reindeer Husbandry 
In  Northern  Sweden
13,  forests  cover  approximately  9.4  million  hectares, 
constituting  about  48  %  of  the  total  land  area  (Statistical  Yearbook  of 
Forestry, 2008). Thus, forestry is an important component of the regional 
economy, producing timber and pulpwood. Ownership of the forestland is 
divided  between  large  corporations  (49.8%),  non-industrial  private  forest 
owners (37.9%) and the State (5.9 %) (Paper I). 
However, much of the same land, shaded gray in fig. 1, is also used for 
grazing about 230 000 reindeer, managed by about 4 700 reindeer herders. 
Reindeer herding is an exclusive right of the Sami people. The reindeer 
owners are organized in 51 Reindeer Herding Communities (RHC), which 
serve both as geographical entities delimiting grazing areas and economic 
organizations representing their member’s interests (Statistics Sweden, 1999). 
Reindeer husbandry is also an important part of the Sami culture, playing a 
key role in the cultural identity of the Sami (Bostedt, et al., 2003; Danell, 
2004; Riseth, 2006). 
The reindeer herds follow a migration cycle, mainly grazing in pastures 
close to, or in the mountains during the summer, and moving to forests 
closer  to  the  coast  during  the  winter
14,  where  they  mainly  graze  lichens 
(Cladina, Alectoria and Bruoria spp.) and are highly dependent on free-grazing 
areas in mature forests. Supplementary fodder is used only when essential, 
because of its high cost. The climate conditions are also an important factor 
in  the  provision  of  fodder.  Since  the  reindeer  dig  for  forage  during  the 
winter  months,  the  snow  conditions  are  vital  (Statistics  Sweden,  1999; 
Moen, 2008). An additional factor affecting grazing conditions is forestry, 
since  the  growth  of  lichens  requires  appropriate  light  and  moisture 
conditions, thus forest management decisions also affect grazing possibilities 
(Gaio-Olivera et al., 2006; Moen, 2008).  
2.2  Property Rights 
Property rights can be characterized as a “social relation that defines the property 
holder with respect to something of value against all others” (Bromley, 1992, p.4), 
and can be divided into full ownership, (by the state or private owners), 
common property and usufructuary rights (Bromley, 2006).  A usufructuary 
right is a nontransferable right to use a resource and exclude others from the 
                                                 
13 See Paper 1 for details on land use, resource users and identification of key issues of the 
conflict 
14 Grazing land is divided into two areas, year-round (allowed all year) and winter grazing 
areas (allowed from 30 October till 30 April) (Statistics Sweden, 1999).   23 
similar  use  of  the  resource.  In  addition,  for  completeness,  no  one  has 
exclusive rights over some things (often wild animals or open-access areas of 
land) regarded as res nullius (literally nobody’s thing); a status that should not 
be confused with the common property regime (Bromley & Cernea, 1989; 
Ostrom, 2003; Bromley, 2006).  
The forest resource in Northern Sweden is subject to parallel property 
rights,  since  the  forestry  sector  owns  the  timber  resource  while  reindeer 
herders have usufructuary rights to graze reindeer on land owned by the 
state, forest companies and non-industrial private forest owners (SwRHA, 
1971:437; Statistics Sweden, 1999; Hahn, 2000). The usufructuary rights are 
protected by law in the same manner as private property rights, so both of 
the  two  groups  of  stakeholders  have  legally-enshrined  rights  to  use 
forestland (Hahn, 2000). However, the reindeer husbandry land use rights 
have  always  been  contentious  since  the  time  when  farmers  and  foresters 
colonized the northern parts of Sweden and Swedish land use policy began 
to  be  formulated  and  enforced  (Allard,  2006).  While  grazing  rights  are 
strong in year-around areas, reindeer grazing rights are disputed in some 
winter grazing areas, particularly in the southern parts (SOU 2006:14). 
It  should  be  noted  here  that  International  Labor  Organization 
Convention (ILO) 169
15 could strengthen the reindeer herders’ rights to use 
land and water, but Sweden has not yet ratified it (Hahn, 2000; Paper IV)
16.  
2.3  The Institutional Arrangement - Consultations on Forest 
Land 
The two sectors use land in parallel for different purposes, and adversely 
affect  each  other  causing  externalities:  forestry  by  harvesting  timber  in 
grazing  areas,  and  reindeer  husbandry  through  the  reindeer  trampling 
seedlings, rubbing their antlers on branches and breaking shoots or branches 
when digging in the snow to find lichens (Roturier & Bergsten, 2006). The 
                                                 
15  ILO  (International  Labor  Organization)  aims  at  guarding  the  worker’s  conditions  and 
discrimination. By installing the ILO 169 convention, the rights of indigenous peoples and 
their integrity is protected. Among other things, the convention aims at special protection 
of the indigenous peoples’ institutions, property, land use, culture and environment. The 
convention also state that consultations between government and indigenous peoples on 
matters that concern the group should be held and that the group should be given the 
possibility to decide over their own future and development. The convention was installed 
1991 and countries are able to ratify the convention to protect indigenous peoples rights 
and integrity. Sweden has not to date ratified the ILO 169 (SOU 1999:25). 
16 For further developed discussion on conventions and indigenous peoples, see Johansson, 
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externalities are substantial; modern forestry is considered one of the major 
threats to the reindeer herding sector, while foresters argue that conforming 
to  the  needs  of  reindeer  husbandry  is  not  economically  defensible 
(Björklund, 2000; Persson, 2000; Danell, 2004). Bostedt et al. (2003) also 
show that the opportunity costs are too high to be defensible. However, the 
effect of externalities on the reindeer husbandry sector is more severe than 
their effect on forestry (Mattsson, 1981; Hahn, 2000; Paper II). For these 
reasons, together with the uneven property rights situation (Hahn, 2000), 
the State recognized the growing conflicts over land use between forestry 
and reindeer husbandry early in the 1970s and introduced consultations to 
foster bilateral agreements regarding land use. The intended function of the 
consultations  was  to  strengthen  the  position  of  reindeer  husbandry  in 
relation to the forest sector (Prop 1990/91:3).  
Each forest company (see Box 1) is obliged to hold consultations with 
RHCs before applying for felling permits in management units larger than 
500  hectares  for  clearings  larger  than  20  hectares  (10  hectares  in 
mountainous  forests)  within  each  area  and  for  fellings  conducted  in 
preparation  to  construct  forest  roads.  In  addition,  consultations  are 
mandatory for fellings in important, tree-lichen rich areas, areas used for 
moving the reindeer, areas on the border of clearings and in young stands 
covering more than 20 hectares (10 hectares in mountainous forests) (SKSFS 
1993:2). During consultations forest companies
17 outline the areas that will 
be affected by their actions, e.g. final fellings, soil scarification, fertilization 
and  forest  road  construction.  Minutes  should  be  taken,  and  included  in 
applications  for  fellings  together  with  a  duly  completed  standard  form 
detailing  considerations  regarding  reindeer  husbandry  (SKSFS  1993:2; 
Hamilton,  2003).  Applications  for  felling  permits  may  be  rejected  if 
consultations have not been properly conducted (Prop 1990/91:3).  
This legal consultation framework applies to year-round grazing areas, 
leaving  the  important  winter  grazing  areas  outside  consultations,  partly 
because the reindeer herders’ land rights on winter grazing land are not as 
strong as on the year-round land (Prop. 1990/91:3; SOU 2006:14). 
It is possible that voluntary solutions could effectively bolster the reindeer 
herders’ rights to use winter grazing areas. Indeed, when forest companies 
started  to  join  certification  programs,  which  include  clauses  regarding 
concern for indigenous peoples, consultations were voluntarily extended to 
                                                 
17  Non-industrial  private  forest  owners  are  not  obliged  to  engage  in  the  consultations 
process, although a government investigation has proposed that they should be obliged to 
do so in the future (SOU 2001:101). 
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include  winter  grazing  areas  (Prop.  1990/91:3).  The  FSC  introduced 
consultations on winter grazing areas with the same rules as those applied to 
the year-round areas (FSC, 2000). In addition, the PEFC (Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification) promotes collaboration between 
forestry and reindeer husbandry. It instructs certified companies to consider 
the  needs  of  reindeer  husbandry  when  applying  treatments  such  as  soil 
scarification  and  road  construction ( PEFC,  2006).  However,  PEFC 
certification is a weaker certification framework than FSC when it comes to 
the indigenous land use rights (Keskitalo et al., forthcoming) 
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3  Theoretical Framework 
A  core  problem  of  collective  actions  consists  of  eliminating  externality 
problems when large groups are involved (Olson, 1965). Further problems 
in many CPR situations are ‘free-riding’ and the likelihood that stakeholders 
may act solely in their own interests rather than for the benefit of the whole 
stakeholder group (Olson, 1965; Marshall, 2005). These issues, and the need 
to establish incentives to deter such behavior, complicate the management 
and  creation  of  institutional  arrangements.  Furthermore,  in  a  CPR  it  is 
difficult  to  limit  resource  users  or  to  prevent  other  users  from  drawing 
benefits from it, i.e. excludability. In addition, another user cannot use the 
resource when the resource is consumed, i.e. it is “subtractable” (Ostrom et 
al., 1997; Ostrom, 2003). As the CPR-framework was developed, theories 
concerning  individual  behavior,  social  choice  and  strategic  interaction 
evolved (e.g., Olsson 1965; Dawes, 1973; 1975).  
In this section, theoretical concepts needed to analyze the robustness of 
the institutional arrangement between forestry and reindeer husbandry are 
discussed. 
3.1  The Commons, Collective Actions and Market Failures 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ concept, first formulated by Hardin in 1968, 
introduced the idea of over-use and degradation of a resource due to a lack 
of institutional arrangements to regulate its use (Hardin, 1968). Following 
Hardin’s model, Dawes (1973; 1975) formalized the tragedy as a prisoner’s 
dilemma,  which  is  conceptualized  as  a  non-cooperative  game.  An 
interesting  aspect  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  is  the  paradox  that  rational 
individual choices can lead to irrational collective choices (Ostrom, 1990; 
Baland  &  Platteau,  1996;  Ostrom  et  al.,  1997).  This  led  to  the  logic  of 
collective action, developed by Olson (1965), which discusses the interesting   28 
behavior  of  individuals  when  interacting  in  groups  having  common 
interests. Olson summarizes the logic of collective action as follows: 
 “…if the members of some group have a common interest or object, and if 
they  would  all  be  better  off  if  that  objective  were  achieved  […],  the 
individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested, act 
to achieve that objective” (Olson, 1965, p.1).  
Olson stresses that there are few incentives for single actors to contribute 
voluntarily to the provision of a collective good, especially in cases of large 
stakeholder  groups  (Olson,  1965;  Marshall,  2005).  Olson’s  argument  can 
also be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma and the logic of prisoner’s dilemma 
games can be used to illustrate social dilemmas in cases where the outcome 
is non-Pareto optimal (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Marshall, 2005; Ostrom, 
2005).  CPR-analysis  evolved  to  evaluate  institutional  solutions  to  the 
collective action problem (Marshall, 2005).  
Game theory frameworks can be used to explore how and why social 
dilemmas evolve and why they may readily lead to policy disputes or open 
conflicts (Kyllönen et al., 2006). In addition to using game theory to address 
social dilemmas, the market-failure concept can also be sued to explain the 
need for institutions and to assess their performance. Market failures occur 
when the market forces do not lead to optimal allocation, i.e. does not fulfill 
the  goals  of  Pareto  efficiency  and  optimal  social  welfare.  Externalities 
comprise one type of market failure, which can be addressed by various 
policy instruments, e.g. direct regulation through taxes, subsidies, tradable 
permits and/or property rights creations (Sterner, 2003). 
 In an externality situation “unwanted costs are visited on others” (Bromley, 
1991, p.60), and there are no contractual terms or other mechanisms for 
internalizing the externality. In other words, there are costs, besides market 
costs, which have not been internalized by the market forces and thus the 
market cannot induce Pareto optimal behavior (Dahlman, 1979; Bromley, 
1991). Transaction costs are indicators of externalities, because without such 
costs, the externalities would be internalized by ‘costless’ bargaining (Coase, 
1960; Dahlman, 1979). Following Coase’s arguments, the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) approach evolved, in which institutions are analyzed from 
an  economic  perspective  (including  transaction  costs).  NIE  considers 
institutional environments and governance, the ‘rules’ of the game and the 
way the game is played (Williamson, 1998; 2000). Further, Challen (2000) 
concluded that transaction costs may be useful for explaining the character 
of institutions in institutional analyses.’ 
Connected to the Pareto optimality concept, there are effective models 
to identify and analyze externalities, but it is equally important to understand   29 
the structure of the institutions that are subject to the externalities, since the 
institutions define the property rights situation (Bromley, 1991).  
Important aspects to consider when studying an institutional arrangement 
regulating a CPR include: (1) the nature of the resource; (2) the supply and 
demand of the resource; (3) characteristics of the users; and (4) legal and 
political  features  of  the  environment  that  affect  its  use,  and  thus  are 
important determinants of the outcome (Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 
1990; 2005). For such studies the IAD-framework is useful since it provides 
a means to understand the institutional arrangement, in terms of these four 
aspects, thus connecting problems related to collective action with problems 
associated with internalizing externalities. The rest of this section discusses 
the connecting theories used to analyze the institutional arrangement in the 
IAD framework.  
3.2  Theories for Analyzing the Action Arena 
3.2.1  Power Relations within the Management Regime 
A co-management regime is often helpful for solving resource management 
situations,  resolving  conflicts  and  promoting  co-existence  (Berkes,  1989; 
Pinkerton, 1989; Campbell, 1996; Jentoft, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Carlsson 
& Berkes, 2005). However, the term co-management has a wide variety of 
definitions and it is used rather loosely to include many types of user groups 
and  management  situations.  Despite  the  diversity  of  the  definitions,  they 
seem to share three features: (1) the term is connected to natural resource 
management, (2) some sort of partnership between private and public actors 
is  involved,  and  (3)  co-management  is  an  ongoing  process  (Carlsson  & 
Berkes, 2005). Since co-management in the studied context involves two 
groups  of  stakeholders  managing  the  forest  resource,  the  term  co-
management is understood as “a situation in which some or all of the relevant 
stakeholders  […]  are  involved  in  a  substantial  way  in  management  activities” 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996, p.12). The stakeholders then negotiate, define 
and guarantee sharing of the resource within a given territory
18 (Borrini-
Feyerabend, 1996). Co-management usually implies integrated management 
between the State and local actors (Berkes, 1994). However, in the forestry-
reindeer husbandry situation the State has delegated the responsibilities of 
management to the local stakeholders. Under the legal framework, which 
                                                 
18 Furthermore, in a co-management regime decentralized governance is promoted, and thus 
has strong resemblance to self-governance, i.e. autonomous, interdependent regulation of 
the  interactions  between  the  stakeholders  (Kooiman,  2003),  see  Paper  II  for  further 
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provides  large  degrees  of  freedom,  the  foresters  have  control  over  the 
institutional arrangement, through their role as initiators of the consultations 
(Paper II). 
In a co-management situation the stakeholders, encouraging interaction 
and communication between them, take decisions cooperatively and several 
studies  have  shown  that  co-management  fosters  greater  legitimacy  than 
centralized  management.  Further,  stakeholders  seem  to  become  more 
sensitive to each other’s needs and more perceptive of the other stakeholders 
in  co-management  situations  (Osherenko,  1988;  Berkes,  1989;  Jentoft  & 
Kristoffersen,  1989;  Pinkerton,  1989;  Ostrom,  1990;  Berkes  &  Preston, 
1991; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997).  
Clearly,  no  institutional  arrangement,  including  co-management,  can 
provide an absolute solution to all problems or an ideal framework for all 
management situations in isolation. The co-management arrangement has to 
be based on solid foundations of property rights, which can be effectively 
monitored  and  enforced  (Phillipson,  2002).  Thus,  it  is  also  essential  to 
ensure that power is appropriately distributed between the stakeholders. 
 One way to measure the power distribution in a management regime is 
to study the influence of the stakeholders over the resource, for instance 
using  the  well-established  ladder  of  participation,  introduced  by  Sherry 
Arnstein (1969) and adapted by Berkes (1994), which builds on the classical 
Dahlian  notion
19  of  power  (see  also  Pinkerton,  1989;  Campbell,  1996; 
DePaoli, 1999; Paper II). 
The ladder of participation has two dimensions (levels of influence over 
resource management and levels of participation) and each of the ‘rungs’ 
equates to an important element of a co-management regime (Paper II). 
The  level  of  co-management  in  a  given  situation  can  be  identified  by 
analyzing  the  management  regime  in  terms  of  the  influence  of  the 
stakeholders  in  management  of  the  resource.  In  practice,  the  balance  of 
power may change over time, in such cases the ladder of participation can 
also be used to evaluate the effects of changes in management and/or the 
stakeholders’ influence. Each of the rungs of the ladder also corresponds to a 
certain  level  of  influence  in  management,  and  hence  level  of  co-
management.  The  first  three  rungs  –  information  (1),  dialogue  (2),  and 
communication (3) – cannot be characterized as co-management situations, 
                                                 
19 The classical Dahlian notion of power implies that “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can  get  B  to  do  something  that  B  would  not  otherwise  do”  (Dahl,  1957,  p.202-3).  Other 
definitions  of  power  are  more  complex.  However,  Dahl’s  minimal  power  definition  is 
applicable in empirical evaluations, although important aspects of power may be neglected. 
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since  stakeholders  are  given  few  opportunities  to  actually  participate  in 
management. In situations corresponding to the next three rungs – advisory 
system  (4),  co-operation  (5)  and  management  board  (6)  –  there  are 
increasing  degrees  of  influence,  and  hence  of  co-management.  The 
stakeholders’ different resource objectives are increasingly incorporated in 
management  of  the  resource.  In  arrangements  corresponding  to  the  last 
rung, partnership (7), the stakeholders participate equally, sharing power and 
making  decisions  collectively  (Arnstein,  1969;  Berkes  &  Preston,  1991; 
Berkes, 1994). 
The forestry-reindeer husbandry management regime can be evaluated 
using the ladder of participation. Since foresters own the resource, and thus 
are  the  stronger  party,  the  power  of  the  reindeer  herders  in  relation  to 
forestry  is  subject  to  analysis.  A  change  in  power  relations  has  direct 
economic implications for each of the stakeholders. However, each step up 
to another rung implies that the reindeer herders have greater influence in 
consultations. In addition, changes that have a minor impact on forestry may 
have substantial effects on reindeer husbandry, although there have been few 
empirical  studies  to  substantiate  this  hypothesis  (e.g.,  Mattsson,  1981; 
Bostedt et al., 2003). 
3.2.2  Analyzing the Robustness of the Management Regime  
To evaluate if a co-management situation is stable or viable i.e., robust, 
the power relations between the stakeholders are not the only important 
aspects  to  consider.  The  design  principles,  developed  by  Ostrom  (1990; 
2005) are used to assess the robustness of the forestry-reindeer husbandry 
management  regime.  The  eight  design  principles  (further  developed  in 
paper  II)  are;  clear  boundaries  (1),  correspondence  between  benefits  and 
costs  (2),  collective  choice  (3),  monitoring  (4),  graduated  sanctions  (5), 
conflict resolution mechanisms (6), rights to organize (7), and multi-level 
governance  (8).  The  design  principles  can  be  used  to  identify  robust 
regimes,  and  underlying  weaknesses  that  are  likely  to  lead  to  failures  to 
establish effective regimes. However, there may be a danger in using the 
design  principles  if  managers  only  strive  to  fulfill  them,  neglecting  the 
intended  aims  of  the  institutional  design,  and  thus  failing  to  establish 
effective  management  (Ostrom,  2005).  Hence,  the  use  of  the  design 
principles has to be seen in the context of the complex management regime, 
using the principles to identify underlying factors that lead to inefficiency.    32 
3.2.3  Analyzing the Optimal Influence in the Management Regime 
A  model  to  determine  the  reindeer  herders’  optimal  influence  was 
developed by considering the social planner’s perspective, i.e. the societal 
optimal  level  for  all  stakeholders.  The  model  was  built  on  optimization 
assumptions, including assumptions regarding the management activities of 
all stakeholders involved in the institutional arrangement, which reflect their 
influence in forest management and the power distribution. Further, since 
each stakeholder’s management activities affect the profits of all stakeholders, 
to varying degrees, the model can also be used to elucidate the economic 
effect of changes in the reindeer herders’ influence in forest management, 
and thus determine their socially economically optimal level of influence. 
3.2.4  Transaction cost analysis of the action arena 
Transaction  cost  theory  was  originally  developed  to  analyze  costs  arising 
when  externalities  are  present  in  interactions  between  economic 
organizations in the industrial sector (Coase, 1937; 1960; Williamson, 1998; 
2000; Dahlman, 1979; North, 1990). However, transaction costs are being 
increasingly used in the study of institutions, especially in analyses of natural 
resource management (Hanna, 1994; 2003; Abdullah, et al., 1998; Challen, 
2000;  McCann  et  al.,  2005).  In  some  cases,  at  least,  externalities  can  be 
internalized  in  attempts  to  improve  overall  welfare,  through  negotiations 
(Coase, 1960; Dahlman, 1979). Hence, the effectiveness of arrangements in 
practice  often  depends  on  the  possibilities  to  reduce  transaction  costs 
(Libecap,  1991;  Hanna,  2003;  Mburu  et  al.,  2003).  Consequently, 
individuals often prefer institutional arrangements that minimize transaction 
costs,  and  thus  optimally  internalize  externalities  and  maximize  welfare
20 
(Abdullah et al., 1998; Challen, 2000). 
However, transaction costs are seldom taken explicitly into account in 
analyses of natural resource management, even though including transaction 
costs improves analyses of institutions, possible alternatives, policy choices 
and  policy  design  (Hanna,  1994;  Abdullah  et  al.,  1998;  McCann  et  al., 
2005).  In  addition,  the  analysis  of  transaction  costs  also  demands  deeper 
understanding of the political and natural resource systems and the ways in 
                                                 
20 However, welfare, i.e. Pareto, improvements are difficult to achieve since it is difficult to 
find arrangements that can make one person better off without making some other person 
worse off. It is thus more appropriate to use the Kaldor-Hicks framework in which one 
actor, at least in theory, compensates others suffering from an externality. This can then be 
used to search for Pareto improvements, rather than true Pareto efficiency (Kaldor, 1939; 
Hicks, 1940). 
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which policy is made and implemented (McCann et al., 2005). Analyses of 
transactions  costs  also  provide  a  means  to  capture  effects  of  institutional 
changes  over  time,  or  of  single  events,  since  they  are  functions  of  the 
institution (North, 1990). 
The definitions of transaction costs vary depending on the context. For 
instance, Coase (1960) defines them as the costs of participating in a market 
or implementing governmental policy, while others (e.g. Demsetz, 1968; 
Allen,  1991)  focus  on  the  costs  of  establishing  and  maintaining  property 
rights.  However,  despite  the  differences  in  definitions,  the  fundamental 
concept of a transaction cost is that it includes both the ex ante and ex post 
costs of a situation (Matthews, 1986; Ostrom, et al., 1993; Abdullah et al., 
1998; Williamson, 2000). In the forestry-reindeer husbandry relationship the 
ex ante costs correspond to the costs arising from the relationship before and 
during consultation, while the ex post costs correspond to costs arising from 
the consultations, e.g. costs of monitoring and evaluating land use. The ex 
ante and ex post costs can, in turn, be divided into three sub-sets: information 
costs,  collective  decision-making  costs,  and  collective  operational  costs 
(Abdullah et al., 1998). The information (ex ante) costs include costs such as 
those of acquiring knowledge of the resource and its users, and organizing 
the information for decision-making purposes (Abdullah et al., 1998). The 
quality (i.e. the amount, type and accuracy) of the information is important 
for creation of successful institutional arrangements. A lack, or poor quality, 
of  information  may  lead  to  information  asymmetry,  which  in  turn  may 
increase  transaction  costs.  Typical  examples  of  information  asymmetries 
include  traditional  knowledge  versus  knowledge  obtained  from  research, 
and poor knowledge exchange (Sterner, 2003; McCann et al., 2005). Next, 
the collective decision-making (also ex ante) costs are those associated with 
strategic  planning  and  the  co-ordination  of  resource  use  within  the 
institutional arrangement. The institutional design and its effectiveness are 
important aspects to consider in attempts to create arrangements to regulate 
natural resource use that suit all stakeholders, while keeping transaction costs 
within acceptable limits (Hanna, 1994; Abdullah et al., 1998). The last sub-
set,  collective  operational  (ex  post)  costs  accrue  as  decisions  within  the 
institutional arrangement are enforced, and may include conflict resolution, 
evaluation and/or monitoring costs (Hanna, 1994; Abdullah et al., 1998).  
Bromley (1991) observed that, since property rights structures influence 
transaction costs, the weaker stakeholder in the institutional arrangement has 
to initiate actions to deal with the other stakeholder.   34 
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4  Research Design 
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  the  research  underlying  this  thesis  was 
based on the IAD-framework, focusing on the robustness and efficiency of 
the  action  arena.  To  analyze  consultations  a  first  important  step  was  to 
understand  the  exogenous  variables  that  affect  the  action  arena,  aspects 
addressed in Paper I. Next, the management regime was analyzed using the 
variables labeled in the top box of figure 2. The potential outcome of the 
management regime depends on the participants, information, control and 
net  costs  and  benefits.  The  participants  and  the  positions  they  adopt, 
together  with  the  actions  and  the  control  are  linked  to  the  potential 
outcome of actions taken in the arena (Ostrom, 2005); aspects addressed in 
Papers II and III. The theoretical bases of the analyses in Paper II are the 
ladder  of  participation  and  the  design  principles,  while  the  ladder  of 
participation and social planner’s model were utilized in Paper III. Further, 
the net costs and benefits associated with the action arena affect the potential 
outcome  (Ostrom,  2005),  which  was  evaluated,  by  analyzing  transaction 
costs, in Paper IV.  
In addition to the theoretical approaches to analyzing the action arena, an 
empirical model (ladder of participation) was used to observe the interactions 
and  outcomes  of  the  action  arena,  as  described  in  Paper  II,  while  a 
theoretical  framework  (social  planner’s  model  and  transaction  costs)  was 
used to predict interactions and outcomes of the arena in Papers III and IV.   36 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is based on both qualitative and quantitative methods. In addition 
to  literature  studies,  individual  interviews,  focal  group  interviews, 
collaborative learning and scenario techniques are used. Further, data was 
gathered to facilitate the numerical solution of an optimization model as 
well  as  simulation  analysis.  For  details  of  each  of  the  methodological 
consideration, turn to the papers in the appendix.   
Figure 2. The IAD-framework and analysis of the action arena 
(adapted from Ostrom, et. al., 1997; Imperial, 1999; Ostrom, 2005)   37 
5  Overview of Appended Papers 
In this section each of the appended papers is briefly summarized, and the 
methods used and main results are presented. For details, turn to the specific 
papers. 
5.1  Forestry and Reindeer Husbandry in Sweden – the 
Development of a Land Use Conflict (Paper I) 
In  this  first  paper,  the  aim  was  to  identify  and  elucidate  the  contextual 
variables  (exogenous  variables  in  the  IAD-framework)  that  affect  the 
stakeholders in consultations, based on literature studies.  
The state of the lichen resource is difficult to investigate. Foresters have 
good knowledge of the timber resource since they keep detailed plans of 
their forest areas, but they have no incentive to keep records of the lichen 
resource.  Reindeer  herders’  records  of  the  lichen  resource  are  limited, 
usually  consisting  of  traditional  knowledge  that  is  not  written  down. 
Attempts have been made to document the grazing resource through the 
Land Use Plan for reindeer husbandry (LUP), but it is a time-consuming 
and costly measure implemented by only 14 of the 51 RHCs
21. However, 
data, collected in 1955 and 1995, indicate that the proportion of lichen-rich 
forestland is decreasing, due to changes in the age distribution of trees that 
have occurred within forests in Northern Sweden over the last 80 years. 
The proportion of young forests has almost doubled in this time, and the 
conditions have become less suitable for the growth of lichens since the 
young forests are dense. Furthermore, the National Board of Forestry
22 is 
concerned that forests, particularly in Northern Sweden, are being overused 
                                                 
21 Six RHCs are currently using the LUP, a further eight are making efforts to implement it, 
and 19 more RHCs are waiting to start the implementation (Sandström, 2008). 
22 Skogsstyrelsen in Swedish.    38 
and that harvest rates are not sustainable, especially since storms in southern 
parts of Sweden have increased the pressure on forests in the north.   
Next, in terms of societal attributes, the historical development of land 
use together with the development of the society’s attitudes toward the two 
sectors was analyzed. The attitudes toward land use have historically shifted 
several times from the 16
th century to our time. In the 16
th century, farmers 
colonized forestland in order to increase agricultural activities. At the same 
time,  reindeer  husbandry  was  recognized  as  an  important  land  use. 
However, as mining and subsequently forestry began to develop, the state 
started to recognize the value of the forest and forestland, pushing reindeer 
herding from previously used land. As the forest sector became industrialized 
during the 1950s and 1960s, conflicts over land use between forestry and 
reindeer  husbandry  became  deeper.  However,  the  Swedish  state  made 
attempts  to  protect  the  reindeer  herding  sector,  by  setting  a  ‘cultivation 
border’, above which colonization was prohibited. The economic value of 
timber,  the  growing  forest  sector  and  the  need  for  unbroken  land  for 
colonization  purposes  were,  however,  regarded  as  more  important,  and 
given priority over reindeer husbandry. These shifts have led to confusion 
over land use rights and the attitude towards each of the sectors.  
The last contextual factor affecting the action arena is the rules-in-use. 
Although reindeer husbandry has co-existed with colonizers/forestry since, 
at least, the 17
th century, law and regulations regarding their relationship 
were vague or non-existent until the end of the 19
th century. Then the first 
Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act was introduced, originally to regulate the 
Sami right to herd reindeer and the movement of reindeer between Sweden 
and Norway. Forestry was regulated through the Swedish Forestry Act in 
1903, initially to ensure forest regeneration, and later extended to consider 
economic dimensions of forestry and natural conservation issues.  
As conflicts over land use increased, due to societal developments, the 
need  for  conflict-resolving  mechanisms  became  acute.  Consequently,  the 
State  initiated  consultations.  However,  the  State  chose  to  endow  the 
consultations  with  a  large  degree  of  freedom,  which  led  to  vague 
perceptions of what consultations mean, what should be included and what 
consideration forestry had to give to reindeer husbandry.  
The independent variables all in all indicate that the two stakeholders 
have different views of land use and land use management. As conflicts over 
land use still occur, the consultations are insufficient to provide an arena 
where the two land use views can be customized.  
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5.2  Stakeholders’ Perceptions of Consultations as Tools for Co-
management – A Case Study of the Forestry and Reindeer 
Herding Sectors in Northern Sweden (Paper II) 
This  paper  explores  the  present  institutional  arrangement’s  ability  to 
consider the interests of each of the stakeholders, by focusing on the power 
distribution between them, using the ladder of participation to evaluate the 
power relations and design principles to evaluate the management situation, 
based mainly on responses in interviews with stakeholders.  
The  results  shows  that  about  half  of  the  reindeer  herders  think 
consultations have little or no significance. Few think that the consultations 
have considerable significance, indicating that most reindeer herders think 
consultations have no use for them. However, most of the reindeer herders 
think  the  importance  consultations  has  increased  over  time.  Forest 
companies  have  an  opposite  opinion  regarding  the  significance  of 
consultations, considering reindeer husbandry to have considerable or great 
impact on forest management.  
The power distribution between the two groups of stakeholders was then 
assessed  using  the  ladder  of  participation.  Foresters  and  reindeer  herders 
were  asked  to  indicate  the  degree  of  influence  they  think  reindeer 
husbandry  has  in  consultations.  The  results  show  that  both  sectors  have 
about  the  same  understanding  of  reindeer  husbandry’s  influence  in 
consultations. The respondents were also asked if reindeer herders’ influence 
could  be  changed  in  the  future.  Although  reindeer  herders  had  a  rather 
pessimistic  view  of  their  current  influence,  there  was  a  belief  that  their 
influence could be increased in the future. Foresters also thought that the 
influence of reindeer husbandry in forest management could be increased. 
However,  almost  30  %  of  the  foresters  indicated  that  increases  in  the 
influence  of  reindeer  husbandry  in  forest  management  would  not  be 
desirable or possible. Respondents also pointed out that the property rights 
situation is a fundamental determinant of the power distribution. The power 
analysis  shows  that  foresters  exercise  their  ownership  right,  having  full 
power  over  the  resource,  while  reindeer  herders  only  have  usufructuary 
rights. The forest companies who do not think that the reindeer herders’ 
influence should be increased since they do not recognize the usufructuary 
rights. 
In the next step of the analysis the arrangement was evaluated in terms of 
the design principles characteristic of a viable, stable co-management system. 
The results indicate that few of the design principles are fulfilled. Boundaries 
have been set for the resource, regulating who is allowed to use it, although 
there is some dispute over reindeer grazing lands, especially in the southern   40 
part of the reindeer grazing area. However, several of the design principles 
are not met by the present institutional arrangement. There is no reliable 
assessment  of  the  magnitudes  of  cost  and  benefits  of  consultations.  This 
means  that  the  correspondence  between  costs  and  benefits  in  the 
consultation process cannot be assessed. Consequently, the principle of low 
cost  conflict  resolution  is  not  fulfilled.  Further,  the  collective  choice 
principle is not fulfilled since the stakeholders do not have opportunities to 
influence rules concerning consultations. The arrangement was also regarded 
as  being  deficient  in  terms  of  the  monitoring  and  sanction  principles  by 
respondents in the case study (especially the reindeer herders), since there is 
little or no supervision of the forest sector’s actions, and a lack of appropriate 
sanctions when agreements reached in consultations are not kept.    
The respondents in the interviews were also asked to rank measures that 
could  improve  consultations.  The  most  important  measures  cited  were: 
knowledge of each other’ activities, better understanding of the economic 
consequences  of  consultations,  and  personal  relationships  within 
consultations to build trust.  
5.3  Optimal Level of Influence in Forest Management – The 
Case of Consultations between Forestry and Reindeer 
Husbandry Sectors (Paper III) 
In  the  third  paper  the  socio-economically  optimal  level  of  influence  of 
reindeer husbandry in forest management (through consultations) is analyzed 
using an optimization model. The data for the optimization were compiled 
from four previous studies of activities and relevant parameters in a specific 
forest  area  that  is  especially  important  for  reindeer  husbandry,  and 
maintaining the condition of the herds.  
The  results  presented  in  Paper  II  showed  that  reindeer  husbandry’s 
influence  in  consultations  is  weak,  implying  that  power  is  unevenly 
distributed between the reindeer herders and the foresters, prompting the 
question what is the socio-economically optimal level of reindeer husbandry 
influence in forest management? To address this question, an optimization 
model of forest management was created, which optimizes the combined 
discounted profits of forestry and reindeer husbandry as a function of the 
level of influence of reindeer husbandry in forest management. The social 
gain (the increase of the sum of net present values of forest companies and 
reindeer  husbandry)  was  assessed  at  various  level  of  influence.  Based  on 
these assessments it is possible to estimate the economical optimal level of 
influence of reindeer husbandry in forest management. The results of the   41 
optimization indicate that the socially optimal economic level of reindeer 
husbandry’s influence in consultations is low, indicating that forestry should 
give  little  consideration  to  reindeer  husbandry  in  forest  management.  A 
sensitivity analysis was also conducted, which showed that even when effects 
of  timber  harvest  on  larger  areas  than  those  actually  harvested  (due  for 
instance to forest road construction or snow packing on areas close to clear-
cut areas) were included the optimal level of influence is still low.  
In addition, an analysis of changes in the breeding reindeer stock over 
the simulated time period, associated with the optimal economic parameters, 
provided  interesting  results.  The  optimal  number  of  reindeer  fluctuated 
greatly over time. If forestry do not adapt to the need of grazing areas for 
reindeer husbandry to a larger extent, then the optimal reindeer stock would 
be almost halved over the simulated 100 years, or could even diminish or 
disappear depending on the harvest effect multiplier. This implies that the 
effect  of  timber  harvests  is  too  great  for  reindeers  to  survive  on  natural 
grazing, and hence supplementary fodder would be required to maintain the 
reindeer herds.  
5.4  Incentives and Transaction Costs of Institutional Change in 
Multiple Use Commons – The Case of Forestry and 
Reindeer Husbandry in Northern Sweden (Paper IV) 
The last paper analyzes the institutional arrangement in both the current and 
a proposed altered consultation process, focusing on the effect of transaction 
costs on each of the sectors. Three workshops were held using a three-fold 
approach:  focus  group  interviews,  collaborative  learning,  and  scenario 
techniques. To establish the effects of transaction costs on each of the sectors 
a scale ranging from negligible through low and high to very high, is used to 
measure each of the effects of transaction costs.  
The results indicate that the effect of transaction costs is uneven between 
the  sectors.  The  effect  of  transaction  costs  are  assessed  by  studying  the 
specific  actions  taken  in  land  use  management  through  consultations 
identifying explanations of the unevenness. The transaction costs with the 
most uneven effects are those related to collective decision-making, i.e. costs 
of  land  use  planning,  consultation  meetings  and  the  coordination  of 
planning perspectives. The results show that forestry and reindeer husbandry 
have different temporal and spatial scales, i.e. the sectors’ plans have different 
time perspectives and the areas included in the plans differ substantially in 
size. The temporal scales of each sector’s plans conform to the characteristics 
of the resource: forestry conforms to the market demands for timber while   42 
reindeer  husbandry  conforms  to  the  slow-growing  lichen
23.  These 
differences  in  temporal  scales  complicate  the  relationship  within 
consultations, and hence accrue transaction costs. The differences in spatial 
scale  are  due  to  differences  in  the  planned  areas  to  be  used.  Reindeer 
husbandry  requires  large  natural  grazing  areas,  allowing  for  variations  in 
factors such as climate, to ensure there is sufficient grazing throughout the 
year.  However,  the  ownership  of  the  forest  resource  is  fragmented  and 
several different forest owners may own parts of a grazing area, and may 
have  differing  views  on  landscape  planning  and  consultations.  A  further 
factor  affecting  the  consultation  situation  is  the  lack  of  clear,  consistent 
purposes  and  contents  of  consultations.  Foresters  have  the  initiative  in 
consultations, and thus control the process, while reindeer husbandry has to 
conform to the given system. 
Other  aspects  in  which  the  effect  of  transaction  costs  are  unevenly 
distributed,  are  related  to  information  about  the  other  stakeholders,  the 
resource,  and  the  costs  of  collecting  information  about  the  resource. 
Further, the lack of low-cost mechanisms for conflict resolution, monitoring 
and evaluating land use has created transaction costs for both stakeholders, 
although  the  effects  of  these  deficits  are  uncertain.  However,  reindeer 
husbandry, as the subordinate actor in the consultations, is affected more by 
these  transaction  costs  than  forestry,  mainly  because  forestry  has  the 
initiative in consultations.  
The  respondents  in  this  study  indicated  five  aspects  in  need  of 
improvement:  knowledge  of  the  other  stakeholders,  knowledge  of  the 
resource,  clarification  of  the  intended  function  of  consultations,  planning 
perspectives,  and  conflict-resolution.  In  addition,  the  respondents  cited  a 
lack of awareness of the economic effects of consultations. The proposed 
changes to the consultations would affect these five key issues and, thus, the 
transaction  costs,  making  them  (at  least  in  the  long  run)  more  evenly 
distributed.  Since  the  stakeholders  are  free,  within  the  current  legal 
framework,  to  design  consultations  as  desired,  the  proposed  changes  are 
within  the  present  legal  framework.  Changes  in  planning  perspectives, 
together with clear definitions of the institutional framework, could lead to 
substantial improvements. In current forest management, consultations are 
carried out late in the process, and simply by advancing consultations in 
time,  the  temporal  planning  scales  could  be  more  closely  matched.  The 
possibilities for negotiations, and the outcome of consultations, would also 
probably improve. The spatial scales would be more difficult to adjust, since 
consultations  are  held  with  each  of  the  forest  companies  individually.  In 
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addition,  the  costs  of  acquiring  and  organizing  information  may  be 
substantially reduced (and synchronization of the planning process could be 
enabled) by using digitalized LUP tools. Inclusion of lichen data in the forest 
management  planning  process  would  also  increase  the  common  level  of 
understanding of the effects of forest harvests on the total resource, leading 
to  a  more  balanced  planning  perspective.  However,  this  measure  would 
increase the effect of transaction costs on forestry, at least in the short run. 
The analysis also considered possible changes to the incentive structure of 
conducting consultations. Results from this study show that there is no lack 
of ideas for improving consultations. However, no changes have been made 
to date to the process, partly due to the uneven incentive structure. The 
reindeer herders’ incentive to participate in consultations is very strong, due 
to their economic need to secure grazing land, which is affected by forestry 
measures. In contrast, forest companies engage in consultations due to legal 
stipulations regarding year-around areas and the FSC-framework regarding 
winter  grazing  areas.  However,  since  the  legal  framework  is  weak,  each 
forest company is free to implement the legal framework as they see fit. On 
the other hand, a strong incentive for forestry to engage in consultations is 
to avoid further governmental intervention in forest management. None of 
the stakeholders are interested in driving consultations toward a more legally 
regulated system. A further incentive for forestry to engage in consultations 
is  to  improve  their  public  image,  especially  since  the  FSC  (and  many 
potential customers) expect, or demand, indigenous people’s land uses to be 
respected.   44 
 
   45 
6  Concluding Discussion 
A broad range of issues are considered in this thesis, and the underlying 
studies, to acquire a thorough understanding of the management of land 
used for both forestry and reindeer husbandry in Northern Sweden. The 
main  objective  was  to  analyze  the  robustness  and  efficiently  of  the 
institutional arrangement regulating the interactions between these sectors, 
and in this last section the most important results are discussed. The future 
prospects  for  managing  conflict  between  forestry  and  reindeer  husbandry 
(and  for  their  continued  co-existence)  are  also  considered,  together  with 
policy implications and issues that should be addressed in future studies.  
6.1  Innovation and Contribution 
As illustrated in this thesis, the land use management between forestry and 
reindeer husbandry is affected by a complex web of factors, which leads to 
shortcomings in the institutional arrangement. It is important to understand 
both the institutional arrangement and the factors affecting stakeholders to 
explain externalities that occur and their effects on each stakeholder. The 
economic  circumstances  of  reindeer  husbandry  lead  to  conflicts  within 
consultations since reindeer herders often have to reject harvest proposals to 
guard their interests, and although forestry can accept a moratorium for a 
short time, timber has to be harvested sooner or later. Hence, not only the 
externalities  caused  by  harvest  measures,  but  also  difficulties  in  reaching 
agreement in consultations are creating land use conflicts.  
In this situation, the IAD-framework can facilitate attempts to understand 
the consultations, to identify ways to manage conflict and to evaluate the 
robustness of the institutional arrangement. The strength of the framework 
is the scope it provides to combine theoretical underpinnings, models and 
methods  to  capture  the  complexity  of  an  institution.  By  utilizing  the   46 
theories concerning power and robustness of an institutional arrangement in 
combination with the economic theories of welfare theory (social planner’s 
model)  and  new  institutional  economics  (transaction  cost  theory),  the 
institutional and economic aspects complement each other within the IAD-
framework.  The  ambition  is  to  obtain  a  deeper  understanding  of  the 
institutions  and  its  function  in  management.  However,  few  studies  have 
focused on the economic aspect of an institutional framework based on the 
IAD-framework, especially in cases of natural resource management where 
stakeholders with different objectives are involved. In addition, few studies 
have analyzed economic aspects of multiple-use commons, thus the studies 
presented here provide a potentially valuable contribution.  
In  these  studies,  CPR-theories  have  been  combined  with  economic 
frameworks  in  attempts  to  elucidate  complex  aspects  of  land  use 
management between forestry and reindeer husbandry. An analysis of the 
power relation within consultations, based on the stakeholders’ perception 
has been conducted. Further, a social planner’s model has been developed to 
include a power dimension through analyzing reindeer herders’ influence in 
consultations. It provides a first step towards understanding of the economic 
effects of the consultations on each of the stakeholders.  
The  transaction  cost  framework  has  also  been  used  to  analyze  the 
institutional  arrangement  regulating  this  common  pool  resource  with 
conflicting land uses. Thus, the studies contribute both to the theoretical 
framework  of  transaction  costs  and  to  empirical  research  on  forestry  and 
reindeer  husbandry.  Representatives  of  both  sectors  state  that  economic 
understanding of the effect of consultations is lacking, and adjustments to 
the consultation process based on the transaction cost analyses, may provide 
such understanding.  
Multiple  methods  were  used  in  the  studies,  including  individual 
interviews,  focus  group  interviews,  collaborative  learning  and  scenario 
techniques. In the collaborative learning approach the researchers, together 
with the stakeholders, developed a joint understanding of the problems of 
land use management, while the scenario technique was used to nurture this 
learning  process,  allowing  the  stakeholders  to  freely  discuss  possible, 
desirable or undesirable, outcomes. Application of the collaborative learning 
approach  and  scenario  technique  in  this  multiple-use  common  resource 
context  has  been  challenging,  since  the  stakeholder  groups  are 
heterogeneous, with different land use objectives. However, the results of 
the process provided indications not only of possible desirable changes to the 
consultations  process,  but  also  extensive  learning  of  the  effects  of 
consultations on each of the sectors for both stakeholders and researchers.     47 
6.2  Characteristic Features and Persistent Problems of Land 
Use Management  
As the results presented here show, the current institutional arrangement has 
shortcomings  and  it  cannot  be  considered  a  co-management  situation. 
Conflicts over land use occur, despite consultations, and conflicts that occur 
within  consultations  are  not  always  resolved.  The  analysis  of  the 
arrangement also shows that the consultations do not have the characteristics 
(‘design principles’) of a viable, stable management regime. There is a lack 
of low-cost conflict-resolving mechanisms and there is no correspondence 
between costs and benefits. Further, in addition to the absence of conflict 
resolution  mechanisms,  there  is  no  clear,  consistent  definition  of 
consultations. The legal framework does not provide a definition, and leaves 
it to the stakeholders to establish the consultation framework, with reference 
to  freedom-under-responsibility.  The  lack  of  a  reliable  assessment  of  the 
magnitude of costs and benefits within consultations are due essentially to 
the fact that stakeholders lack an understanding of the economic effects of 
consultations.  
There are several reasons why the present institutional arrangement is not 
a  working  co-management  regime.  The  results  of  the  studies  show  that 
contextual factors (exogenous variables in the IAD-framework), power- and 
economically-related issues affect the stakeholders, leading to shortcomings 
in  the  management  regime.  The  contextual  factors  provide  an 
understanding of how the relationships between stakeholders have evolved. 
Historical shifts in the prioritized land uses (farming, reindeer husbandry, 
mining, forestry etc.) have led to confusion regarding land uses. The focus of 
legal regulations covering forestry has also shifted, since at various times the 
main  objectives  of  regulations  regarding  forestland  has  been  to  promote 
regeneration,  maximize  production  and  to  foster  a  sustainable  balance 
between  conservation  and  production.  Linking  these  changing  priorities 
with consideration for the status of the lichen resource, which is essential for 
a  successful  institutional  arrangement  to  regulate  forestry  and  reindeer 
husbandry, is far from straightforward, as previously recognized by Mattsson 
(1981). 
Another reason for the shortcomings is the uneven power distribution 
between the stakeholders. The results show that stakeholders have rather 
same views on reindeer husbandry’s weak influence in consultations. The 
weak influence is further reflected in differences regarding the possibility 
and  desirability  of  changes  in  their  influence  in  future  consultations. 
Reindeer  herders  think  their  influence  could  be  substantially  increased, 
while foresters think only modest changes could be made, and some even   48 
state that increased reindeer husbandry influence would not be desirable. 
Thus,  the  consultations  could  be  characterized  as  an  arena  in  which  the 
stronger party imposes their demands on the weaker party, i.e. as a means to 
implement power. One explanation for this is the uneven property rights 
situation (Hahn, 2000). Another explanation is economy. Forestry is one of 
the region’s most important export industries. Thus, profits of the forestry 
sector affect not only the individual forest company (and its owners) but also 
the regional economy.  
The results also show that, there is unevenness in economic terms with 
concern to the transaction costs. Further, as often seems to be the case, the 
weak stakeholders in the institutional arrangement appear to bear the most 
transaction costs, i.e. the analysis indicates that the transaction costs have 
high effects on reindeer husbandry and low effects on forestry. 
6.3  Continued Co-existence? 
By  striving  toward  a  co-management  regime  the  integration  and 
communication between the stakeholders could be strengthened, leading to 
better conflict management. In addition, the results show indications that if 
no  changes  are  made  the  future  existence  of  reindeer  husbandry may  be 
threatened,  also  found  by  previous  researchers  (e.g.  Danell,  2004). 
However,  reindeer  husbandry  is  considered  a  national  interest  and  has 
significant  value  for  the  Sami  as  a  major  part  of  their  cultural  heritage. 
Furthermore, if ILO Convention 169 is ratified in Sweden, the land use of 
the indigenous peoples has to be considered. This raises questions about the 
measures that would have to be taken to manage conflict between the two 
land use stakeholders with different objectives in order to create a viable, 
stable co-management regime.  
There are, beside the adjustment of the institutional arrangement, two 
hypothetical paths to choose to move towards co-management: regulation 
or  economic  redistribution.  Since  this  thesis  concerns  institutional 
arrangements, based on the present legal framework, the focus of the analysis is 
on the last of these three approaches, but the other two hypothetical solutions 
should be at least briefly mentioned.  
Stronger  regulation  of  land  use  within  the  legal  framework  is  one 
hypothetical solution. This possibility was also discussed in the case study 
(Paper IV), but both stakeholder groups were reluctant to such a solution, 
the foresters more than the reindeer herders. The foresters’ reluctance was 
mainly based on ideological reasons since such an institutional change would 
lead to a situation where they lose control over their property. Although the   49 
reindeer  herders  desire  greater  regulation,  in  particular  concerning  their 
property rights, they perceived detailed regulation concerning operational 
rules as rather unrealistic. Both actors agreed that such detailed regulations 
would heavily reduce the flexible use of forested land and would probably 
lead to more intense conflicts over land use (Sandström et al., 2006, Paper 
IV).  Both  stakeholders  thus  seem  to  be  satisfied  with  the  intention  of 
consultations, but not the performance.  
The next hypothetical solution for continued co-existence is economic 
redistribution, which provides an obvious means to address market failures 
by  obliging  the  stronger  stakeholder  to  compensate  the  weaker  for 
externalities  caused  by  their  land  use.  Results  also  show  that,  from  an 
economic point of view, it is more profitable for forestry to compensate 
reindeer husbandry for lost grazing areas, instead of increasing consideration 
within consultations. Other economic tools are also available to internalize 
externalities, e.g. taxes or subsidies, or the legal regulation of land use, as 
discussed  above.  Findings  based  on  the  social  planner’s  model  show  that 
redistribution  through  forestry  compensating  reindeer  husbandry  for  lost 
grazing abilities, is most likely economically optimal for forestry. However, 
it would probably mean that reindeer husbandry, as practiced today, would 
diminish  or  even  disappear  in  the  future  since  natural  grazing  areas  are 
decreasing. Thus, to ensure reindeer husbandry’s continued existence, the 
compensation  would  have  to  correspond  to  the  cost  of  feeding  reindeer 
with supplementary fodder. However, this could seriously compromise the 
value of reindeer husbandry as a key component of Sami culture. 
The third, and last, possible solution, is to strengthen the institutional 
arrangement within the present legal framework. Representatives of both 
sectors think it is possible to find solutions internally, to enable continued 
co-existence  in  this  way.  This  could  be  done  either  formally  via  the 
parliament or voluntary via the FSC, which certifies all of the major forest 
companies who own forests in this region. The key issues to address are the 
uneven  power  relationship  and  effects  of  transaction  costs.  A  number  of 
possible key measures to achieve this were identified by the stakeholders, 
relating  to  improved  knowledge  of  the  resource  and  the  stakeholders, 
including  economic  understanding,  planning  horizons  and  clarification  of 
the definition of consultations.  
The importance of clarifying the definition of consultations has already 
been discussed. In addition, the planning horizons also need to be adjusted. 
In current consultations, forest companies have planned forest management 
actions in detail before reindeer herders are given the opportunity to share 
their opinion. This is another reason why reindeer herders consider their   50 
influence in forest management to be weak. By altering forest management 
procedures  to  include  consultations  with  reindeer  herders  earlier,  both 
sectors would have longer planning perspectives, allowing (for example) the 
herders  to  graze  areas  that  are  to  be  cleared  in  the  near  future  more 
intensively  than  normal  during  the  preceding  period,  thus  using  grazing 
areas  more  optimally.  In  addition,  the  stakeholders  could  gain  a  deeper 
understanding of land use objectives, especially regarding areas of particular 
importance for reindeer husbandry.  
It  is  also  important  for  the  stakeholders  to  acquire  increasing 
understanding of each other’s sectors, the resource, and the economic effects 
of  decisions  taken  in  consultations.  Several  respondents  mentioned  such 
awareness as an important requirement during the case study. Here research 
can fill important gaps. 
Yet  another  important  aspect  that  could  be  improved  is  the  conflict 
resolution  mechanism.  As  previously  mentioned,  conflicts  that  are  not 
solved  within  consultations  are  left  unresolved.  The  stakeholders  stated  a 
desire for a conflict-resolving mechanism to solve this problem. This study 
does not provide a specific solution to this problem. However, some of the 
proposed changes, such as defining the concept of consultations and moving 
consultations to an earlier stage of forest planning, could potentially reduce 
conflicts over land use, and the results show that the stakeholders would 
prefer mediation rather than a legal resolution of conflicts of land use.  
If  these  changes  are  implemented,  the  transaction  costs  would  be 
decreased (at least in the long run), the effects of transaction costs on each of 
the sectors would be more evenly distributed, and may even enable Pareto 
improvements, according to Kaldor-Hicks criteria. This means that although 
foresters’  transaction  costs  would  slightly  increase,  the  joint  benefits  of 
consultations  would  lead  to  Pareto  improvements.  A  staunch  believer  in 
economic  theory  is  probably  asking  why  these  improvements  have  not 
already been realized. The answer lies in the differences in the incentive 
structure  of  the  stakeholders.  Reindeer  herders  have  strong  incentives  to 
participate  in  consultations,  since  they  need  to  secure  access  to  natural 
grazing and the sector is dependent on the measures taken by the forestry 
sector. The incentives are much weaker for forestry, being based on legal 
obligations, extended by the FSC, to conduct consultations. Another reason 
that no changes have been implemented is that reindeer husbandry would 
probably  benefit  most  from  the  changes,  but  the  reindeer  herders  have 
weaker property rights, and hence are in no position to force through the 
changes.    51 
6.4  Policy Implications 
Although this study has focused on the collective-choice rules, which can be 
affected  by  the  stakeholders,  the  results  of  this  study  have  several  policy 
implications.  The  results  of  the  studies  show  that  both  stakeholders  are 
willing  to  make  some  changes  in  order  to  strengthen  the  institutional 
arrangement,  but  the  question  is  what  changes  are  required?  Theoretical 
findings  show  that  creating  and  sustaining  institutional  arrangements  are 
likely to be problematic if the stakeholder groups are heterogeneous, as they 
are  here,  since  the  two  sets  of  stakeholders  have  very  different  land  use 
objectives and major cultural differences. There is also a risk in such cases, 
that the stronger will dominate the weaker stakeholders (as seems to have 
occurred here). 
The incentive structure, as discussed above, differs strongly between the 
two sectors. There are few indications that forestry, without external forces, 
will  have  any  incentive  to  change  the  present  institutional  arrangement. 
However, external forces may be applied through market-based demands for 
stronger  engagement  in  consultations,  via  FSC  or  PEFC  certification 
regimes and/or State regulation through ratification of ILO 169. The FSC 
policies was also changed in 2002 to include the ILO conventions of land 
use for indigenous peoples, regardless if the specific country has ratified the 
convention or not (FSC, 2002). This have strong implications for reindeer 
husbandry and forestry since Sweden have not ratified ILO 169. 
However the problem of the incentive structure can be solved. Overall, 
the  results  provide  indications  of  the  reasons  for  the  consultations’ 
shortcomings and understanding of each stakeholder’s situation. The results 
also  suggest  changes  to  the  consultation  process  that  could  improve  the 
process. Forestry could use the results to initiate changes to the consultation 
process, driven (in the absence of current incentives to do so) by the threat 
of stronger governmental regulations. Reindeer herders could use the results 
as  foundations  of  arguments  to  pressure  forestry  to  make  changes.  In 
addition, the State could use the results to put pressure on the forestry sector 
to make voluntary changes or, otherwise, to impose stronger governmental 
regulations  concerning  forestry’s  considerations  of  reindeer  husbandry  in 
land use management.  
A  measure  that  is  probably  needed  to  create  a  viable,  stable  co-
management regime between forestry and reindeer husbandry is clarification 
of the property rights. This is manifested in the uncertainty regarding the 
consideration  forestry  has  to  give  to  reindeer  husbandry’s  needs  in 
consultations.    52 
More generally, the results are applicable to other multiple-use commons 
where stakeholders are heterogeneous, with different objectives for uses of 
natural  resources.  The  design  principles  are  important  to  consider  in 
attempts to create a stable, viable co-management regime. However, the 
history of the stakeholders should also be considered. Stakeholder groups are 
often  heterogeneous  in  terms  of  both  culture  and  historical  background, 
which will influence both their positions in the institutional arrangement 
and their use of the resource. Further, it is also important to ensure that the 
property  rights  situation  and  both  the  intention  and  purpose  of  the 
institutional arrangement are clearly defined. These are lessons learned from 
the  analysis  of  the  consultation  process  between  forestry  and  reindeer 
husbandry. 
6.5  Future Studies 
Since  few  studies  have  considered  economic  aspects  of  multiple-use 
commons, especially empirically, and thus no data regarding a number of 
pertinent  variables  are  available,  several  relevant  dimensions  are  not 
addressed by these studies. Notably, the social planner’s model needs to be 
expanded to include the cultural values of reindeer husbandry for the Sami 
community.  It  would  also  be  desirable  to  pinpoint  the  exact  level  of 
influence that is socially optimal, in order to address more fully the exact 
meaning of influence in forest management in economic terms.   
Further, there is a need to increase the understanding of the effects of 
consultations on each of the sectors. It would be desirable to value each of 
the components of consultation in monetary terms, which was not possible 
in these studies. For instance, there is a lack of economic valuation of the 
lichen resource since there is no market for lichens, in contrast to timber. 
Similarly,  there  is  no  market  value  for  the  cultural  value  of  reindeer 
husbandry to the Sami community.  
There  are  also  issues  that  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  which 
would be interesting to address in relation to the institutional arrangement. 
Currently,  the  non-industrial  private  forest  owners  are  not  obliged  to 
participate in consultations. However, a governmental investigation (SOU 
2001:101) has recommended that these owners should also be included in 
the consultation process, but it is not clear how they would be included, nor 
what effects their inclusion would have on land use management.    53 
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